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Gevraagd: enig realisme a.u.b.

876 Posts
Pagina: «« 1 ... 4 5 6 7 8 ... 44 »» | Laatste | Omlaag ↓
  1. [verwijderd] 15 oktober 2007 22:23
    [quote=ruli]

    Ik heb ik in aug en ook nu weer een hoop geld verdiend met shorten.

    Probeer eens echt te argumenteren ipv steeds op de man te spelen?

    Quote]

    Niet zo snel aangebrand Ruli!
    Ik ben blij voor je als je een hoop geld verdiend hebt in augustus, maar wat heb je allemaal verloren in je vorige shortperiode?

    Groet,
    Golfgep
  2. [verwijderd] 15 oktober 2007 22:24
    quote:

    ruli schreef:


    Ben benieuwd naar Azie/Japan vannacht.

    japan niet maar de emergings worden vaak beschouwd als een safe haven.

    een verdere stijging vannacht is best mogelijk, maar dan komen zowel de HSI dicht bij de 30.000 punten en de Sensex bij de 20.000 punten.

    En dan zou er wel eens een correctie kunnen wolgen.

    Dus Ruli ik ben nu ff mee beer voor de USA.

    en vanaf morgen ook voor Azië.

    groetjes

  4. forum rang 10 voda 15 oktober 2007 22:24
    Dames en heren, kunnen we Ruli gewoon zijn winsten laten maken en hem niet meer lastig vallen.
    Hij heeft zijn tijd hard nodig om de juiste beleggingsbeslissingen te nemen. Dit gepost en weer en wederhoor kost alleen maar geld.
    Gelukkig heb je al je verlies al weer goedgemaakt. Proficiat!
    Je bent een ware beleggings goeroe ;-)
  6. forum rang 10 voda 15 oktober 2007 22:39
    quote:

    ruli schreef:

    Het Turkse parlement kan mogelijk woensdag reeds akkoord gaan met een geplande militaire operatie tegen de Koerdische Arbeiderspartij in Noord-Irak, meldden lokale nieuwsstations. Turkije overweegt al geruime tijd een aanval op de bases in Noord-Irak van de Koerdische beweging, die al sinds 1984 strijdt tegen de Turkse regering.

    Waarom denk je dat de olieprijs omhoog vliegt.
    Weer een oorlog erbij..
    Hmmm, niet helemaal onjuist Ruli:

    RTRS-BEURZEN Wall Street: Dow duikt onder de 14.000 punten (2)
    N i e u w bericht, meer informatie

    NEW YORK (ANP) - De Dow-Jonesindex van dertig toonaangevende
    fondsen is maandag onder de psychologisch belangrijke
    14.000-puntengrens beland. Beleggers maakten zich weer zorgen
    over de gevolgen van de kredietcrisis. Die werden gevoed door
    tegenvallende derdekwartaalcijfers van de Amerikaanse bank
    Citigroup. Ook de olieprijs, die naar een recordhoogte steeg,
    deed de handel geen goed.

    De Dow-Jonesindex sloot 108,28 punten lager op 13.984,80
    punten, een verlies van 0,8 procent. De S&P-500 eindigde op
    1548,71 punten. Dat was een daling met 13,09 punten, ofwel 0,8
    procent. De schermenbeurs Nasdaq daalde met 25,63 punten tot
    2780,05 punten, een min van 0,9 procent.

    De oliepijs bereikte maandagavond een nieuw record van ruim
    86 dollar per vat. De stijging werd veroorzaakt door zorgen dat
    de olievoorraden in de Verenigde Staten kleiner zijn dan eerder
    was aangegeven. Ook de politieke spanningen tussen Turkije en
    Irak speelden een grote rol. Beleggers speculeren erop dat de
    hoge olieprijs de inflatie zal aanwakkeren. Dat zou tot een
    krimp in de bestedingen van consumenten en bedrijven kunnen
    leiden.

    De oliefondsen hadden in ieder geval profijt van de hoge
    olieprijs. ExxonMobil, een zwaargewicht in de Dow, steeg met 1,4
    procent. Chevron won 1 procent. ConocoPhillips ging met 0,8
    procent omhoog.

    Afgelopen weekend lekten plannen uit dat een groep van
    banken bezig zouden zijn met het opzetten van een gezamenlijk
    fonds. Dat fonds zou moeten voorkomen dat de kredietcrisis
    banken en de wereldeconomie verder schaadt en klappen en de
    toekomst kan opvangen. Citigroup, dat deel zou uitmaken van het
    fonds, meldde maandag dat de winst in het derde kwartaal ruim is
    gehalveerd door de crisis op de kredietmarkt. Ook kampte de bank
    met hogere kosten bij het verstrekken van consumentenkredieten.
    Bovendien gaf Citigroup aan de inkoop van eigen aandelen terug
    te zullen draaien.

    Citigroup was met een verlies van 3,4 procent een van de
    sterkste dalers in de Dow. Branchegenoot JP Morgan Chase, ook
    een hoofdfonds, moest 1,2 procent inleveren. Ook de rest van de
    financiële sector kreeg klappen op Wall Street.

    Sallie Mae, de grootste kredietverlener aan studenten in de
    VS, daalde met 5,2 procent. Het consortium dat eerder aangaf het
    bedrijf voor 25 miljard dollar te willen kopen, heeft maandag
    bekendgemaakt een streep door de overeenkomst te willen halen.

    De hoge olieprijs zette op Wall Street vooral grote
    industriële bedrijven onder druk. Autoproducent General Motors
    stond met een min van 3,6 procent onderaan de Dow-Jonesindex.
    Machinefabrikant Caterpillar verloor 1,8 procent.
    Vliegtuigbouwer Boeing ging met 1,9 procent naar beneden.

    Biogen Idec was met een winst van ruim 18 procent de
    absolute winnaar in de door technologiefondsen gedomineerde
    Nasdaq. Het biotechnologiebedrijf heeft zichzelf in de etalage
    gezet. Kenners verwachten dat farmaceutische concerns bereid
    zijn tussen de 25 en 30 miljard dollar neer te leggen voor
    Biogen.

    Medtronic was daarentegen een opvallende daler. Het medische
    bedrijf kelderde met ruim 11 procent. Medtronic meldde
    tijdelijk te stoppen met de levering van onderdelen voor
    defibrillatoren omdat het gebruik van de apparaten mogelijk tot
    de dood van vijf patiënten heeft geleid.

    De euro was bij het slot van Wall Street 1,4200 dollar
    waard. Bij het slot van de handel in Europa maandag kostte de
    Europese munt 1,4210 dollar.

    ((ANP Redactie Economie, email economie(at)anp.nl, +31 20
    504 5999))
  7. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 00:58
    quote:

    ruli schreef:

    Golfgep
    Ik reageer slechts op argumenten en niet op verdachtmakingen okay?
    Feit is een voudig dat ik in het voorjaar verkeerd zat en de crash in augustus en ook nu weer juist voorspeld heb.

    Ik zou graag zien dat je eens serieus inging op de door mij aangedragen argumentatie ipv gekibbel om niks.
    Nu juist voorspeld hebben? Zullen we aub eerst eens kijken wat dit wordt?
  8. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 05:58
    Bernanke: Housing Woes to Slow Growth
    Sign In to E-Mail or Save This Print

    By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
    Published: October 15, 2007
    Filed at 9:19 p.m. ET

    WASHINGTON (AP) -- A deepening housing slump probably will be a ''significant drag'' on economic growth into next year and it will take time for Wall Street to fully recover from a painful credit crisis, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke warned Monday.

    Bernanke once again pledged to ''act as needed'' to help financial markets -- which have suffered through several months of turbulence -- function smoothly and to keep the economy and inflation on an even keel.

    ''Conditions in financial markets have shown some improvement since the worst of the storm in mid-August, but a full recovery of market functioning is likely to take time, and we may well see some setbacks,'' Bernanke said in a speech to the New York Economic Club. A copy of his remarks was made available in Washington.

    It was Bernanke's most extensive assessment of the country's current economic situation since the August turmoil unhinged Wall Street.

    The ultimate implications of the credit crunch on the broader economy, however, remain ''uncertain,'' the Fed chief said.

    Against that backdrop, Bernanke said the central bank will be closely watching the economy's vital signs in determining the Fed's next move. He didn't specifically commit to cutting rates again, but rather kept his options open.

    Economists have mixed opinions on whether the Fed will lower interest rates at their next meeting, Oct. 30-31. Some insist the odds are lessening that the Fed will need to slice rates; Others, however, think rates will move lower.

    ''The Fed appears to be in watch mode at the present time,'' said Lynn Reaser, chief economist at Bank of America's Investment Strategies Group.

    To help cushion the economy from the ill effects of the credit crunch and housing slump, the Fed on Sept. 18 slashed a key short-term interest rate by one-half percentage point to 4.75 percent. It marked the first rate cut in more than four years. It also reflected the most aggressive action taken by the Fed to curb fallout from the credit crisis, which intensified in August.

    Since that September meeting, the housing slump -- the worst in 16 years -- has gotten deeper, Bernanke said.

    ''The further contraction in housing is likely to be a significant drag on growth in the current quarter and through early next year,'' he said.

    ''However, it remains too early to assess the extent to which household and business spending will be affected by the weakness in housing and the tightening in credit conditions,'' he added.

    Spending by businesses and individuals is an important ingredient to keeping the economic expansion -- which began in late 2001 -- from fizzling out.

    Developments affecting the job market and income growth also will be watched closely. ''The labor market has shown some signs of cooling, but these are quite tentative so far, and real income is still growing at a solid pace,'' Bernanke observed.

    The benefits of a mostly sturdy employment climate have helped cushion some of the negative effects that the housing slump, weaker home values and a credit crunch have had on consumers.

    Job creation rebounded in September, with employers boosting payrolls by 110,000, the most in four months. Wages grew solidly. The unemployment rate did creep up to 4.7 percent last month but that rate is still considered low by historical standards.

    Given all the problems faced by the economy, the economic performance so far this year ''has been reasonably good,'' Bernanke said.

    On the inflation front, Bernanke noted that the prices of crude oil and other commodities have been rising and that the value of the dollar has weakened. Oil prices galloped to a record high of $86.13 a barrel on Monday.

    Bernanke said the Fed will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully. Yet, with the limited information seen since the central bank's September meeting, the inflation barometers ''are consistent with continued moderate increases in consumer prices,'' he said.

    Fielding questions after his speech, Bernanke said, ''Part of the reason that we have some confidence in inflation remaining well controlled is we expect to see the economy growing more slowly at the end of this year'' and early next year.

    The Fed's September rate reduction, Bernanke said in his speech, has helped ease ''some of the pressure in financial markets, although considerable strains remain.'' He said Fed policymakers were prepared to ''reverse'' the rate reduction if inflation turned out stronger than expected.

    The Fed's next move will be determined by what is best for the economy, Bernanke suggested. As he has said previously, it is not the Fed's job to shield investors from the consequences of bad financial decisions.

    ''The truth is that it (the Fed) can hardly insulate investors from risk, even if it wished to do so,'' Bernanke said. ''Developments over the past few months reinforce this point. Those who made bad investment decisions lost money.''

    The worst carnage has affected investors in ''subprime'' mortgages -- those made to people with spotty credit or low incomes. Some lenders have been forced out of business and some investors in those and related mortgage-backed securities have taken a huge financial hit.

    Asked about what financial or economic information he would like to have but doesn't, Bernanke responded, ''I'd like to know what those damn things are worth,'' referring in general to complicated financial instruments that repackaged debt -- bad debt, in some cases.

    Overstretched homeowners with subprime loans got clobbered by the mortgage meltdown, too. Foreclosures and late payments have soared.

    Weaker home prices seen during the housing bust have made it more difficult for some subprime borrowers to refinance out of loans that offered low ''teaser'' rates but jumped to much higher rates, resulting in payment shocks. Delinquencies on these mortgages are expected to rise further, Bernanke predicted.

    ^--------

    AP Business Writer Tim Paradis in New York contributed to this report.

    ^--------

    On the Net:

    www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Bernan...
  10. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 08:30
    Speech
    Chairman Ben S. Bernanke
    At the Economic Club of New York, New York, New York
    October 15, 2007
    The Recent Financial Turmoil and its Economic and Policy Consequences

    The past several months have been an eventful period for the U.S. economy. In financial markets, sharpened concerns about credit quality induced a retrenchment by investors, leading in some cases to significant deterioration in market functioning. For some households and firms, credit became harder to obtain and, for those who could obtain it, more costly. Tightening credit conditions in turn threatened to intensify the ongoing correction in the housing market and to restrain economic growth. In response to these developments, the Federal Reserve has taken a number of measures to help ensure the normal functioning of financial markets and to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability. In my remarks this evening I will review recent events, discuss the Federal Reserve's responses to those events, and conclude with some comments on the economic outlook in light of recent developments. Although financial markets around the world have come under pressure in the past few months, I will focus my comments primarily on the United States. I will also have little to say this evening about the serious implications of rising rates of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure for troubled borrowers and their communities or about the Federal Reserve's responses to these important problems; I have discussed these issues several times in the past and will return to them in the future.

    The Origins and Evolution of the Financial Turmoil
    Overall, U.S. economic performance so far this year has been reasonably good. The rate of economic expansion slowed somewhat in late 2006 and early 2007, but growth in the second quarter was solid and some of that momentum appears to have carried over into the third quarter. The pace of private-sector job creation has slowed this year, but the unemployment rate has moved up only a little from its recent lows. And, although energy prices have been volatile, indicators of the underlying inflation trend, such as core inflation, have moderated since the middle of last year.

    Moderate growth in overall economic activity has continued despite a notable contraction in the housing sector that began in the second half of 2005. The housing correction has intensified this year as demand has declined further, inventories of unsold new homes have climbed relative to sales, and house prices have decelerated, with some areas of the country experiencing outright declines in home values. In response to weak demand and bloated inventories, homebuilders have sharply curtailed new construction. The decline in residential investment directly subtracted about 3/4 percentage point from the average pace of U.S. economic growth over the past year and a half. In its regular reports to Congress, most recently in July, the Federal Reserve Board has highlighted as a downside risk the possibility that housing weakness might spill over to other parts of the economy--for example, by acting as a restraint on consumer spending. Thus far, however, direct evidence of such spillovers onto the broader economy has been limited.

    The housing correction has taken a more visible toll on the financial markets. In particular, since early this year, investors have become increasingly concerned about the credit quality of mortgages, especially subprime mortgages. The rate of serious delinquencies has risen notably for subprime mortgages with adjustable rates, reaching nearly 16 percent in August, roughly triple the recent low in mid-2005.1 Subprime mortgages originated in late 2005 and 2006 have performed especially poorly, in part because of a deterioration in underwriting standards. Moreover, many recent-vintage subprime loans will experience their first interest-rate resets in coming quarters. With the softness in house prices likely to make refinancing more difficult, delinquencies on these mortgages are expected to rise further.

    At one time, most mortgages were originated by depository institutions and held on their balance sheets. Today, however, mortgages are often bundled together into mortgage-backed securities or structured credit products, rated by credit rating agencies, and then sold to investors. As mortgage losses have mounted, investors have questioned the reliability of the credit ratings, especially those of structured products. Since many investors had not performed independent evaluations of these often-complex instruments, the loss of confidence in the credit ratings led to a sharp decline in the willingness of investors to purchase these products. Liquidity dried up, prices fell, and spreads widened. Since July, few securities backed by subprime mortgages have been issued.

    Investors' reluctance to buy has not been confined to securities related to subprime mortgages. Notably, the secondary market for private-label securities backed by prime jumbo mortgages has also contracted, and issuance of such securities has dwindled.2 Even though default rates on such mortgages have remained very low, the experience with subprime mortgages has evidently made investors more sensitive to the risks associated with other housing-related assets as well.

    The problems in the mortgage-related sector reverberated throughout the financial system and particularly in the market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). In this market, various institutions have established special-purpose vehicles to issue commercial paper to help fund a variety of assets, including some private-label mortgage-backed securities, mortgages warehoused for securitization, and other long-maturity assets. Investors had typically viewed the commercial paper backed by these assets as quite safe and liquid, because of the quality of the collateral and because the paper is often supported by banks' commitments to provide lines of credit or to assume some credit risk. But the concerns about mortgage-backed securities and structured credit products (even those unrelated to mortgages) greatly reduced the willingness of investors to roll over ABCP, particularly at maturities of more than a few days. The problems intensified in the second week of August after the announcement by a large overseas bank that it could not value the ABCP held by some of its money funds and was, as a result, suspending redemptions from those funds. Some commercial paper issuers invoked their right to extend the maturity of their paper, and a few issuers defaulted. In response to the heightening of perceived risks, investors fled to the safety and liquidity of Treasury bills, sparking a plunge in bill rates and a sharp widening in spreads on ABCP.

    The retreat by investors from structured investment products also affected business finance. In particular, issuance of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which in turn had been major buyers of leveraged syndicated loans, fell off significantly during the summer. Demand for leveraged loans slowed sharply, reducing credit access for private equity firms and other borrowers seeking to finance leveraged buyouts (LBOs).

    Concerns about liquidity and credit risk surfaced even in markets in which securitization plays a much smaller role. For example, spreads on lower-tier unsecured commercial paper jumped and issuance was limited to very sh
  11. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 08:34
    maturities. In corporate bond markets, issuance of speculative-grade bonds dropped off sharply as risk spreads widened. And although equity prices have moved up on balance since late spring, swings in prices have been large; indeed, the expected stock-price volatilities implicit in options prices roughly doubled during the summer before falling back more recently.

    As the strains in financial markets intensified, many of the largest banks became concerned about the possibility that they might face large draws on their liquidity and difficult-to-forecast expansions of their balance sheets. They recognized that they might have to provide backup funding to programs that were no longer able to issue ABCP. Moreover, in the absence of an active syndication market for the leveraged loans they had committed to underwrite and without a well-functioning securitization market for the nonconforming mortgages they had issued, many large banks might be forced to hold those assets on their books rather than sell them to investors as planned. In these circumstances of heightened volatility and diminished market functioning, banks also became more concerned about the possible risk exposures of their counterparties and other potential contingent liabilities.

    These concerns prompted banks to become protective of their liquidity and balance sheet capacity and thus to become markedly less willing to provide funding to others, including other banks. As a result, both overnight and term interbank funding markets came under considerable pressure. Interbank lending rates rose notably, and the liquidity in these markets diminished. A number of the U.S. ABCP programs that had difficulty rolling over paper were sponsored by or had backup funding arrangements with European banks. As a result, some of these banks faced potentially large needs for dollar funding, and their efforts to manage their liquidity likely contributed to the pressures in global money and foreign exchange swap markets.

    The U.S. subprime mortgage market is small relative to the enormous scale of global financial markets. So why was the impact of subprime developments on the markets apparently so large? To some extent, the outsized effects of the subprime mortgage problems on financial markets may have reflected broader concerns that problems in the U.S. housing market might restrain overall economic growth. But the developments in subprime were perhaps more a trigger than a fundamental cause of the financial turmoil. The episode led investors to become more uncertain about valuations of a range of complex or opaque structured credit products, not just those backed by subprime mortgages. They also reacted to market developments by increasing their assessment of the risks associated with a number of assets and, to some degree, by reducing their willingness to take on risk more generally. To be sure, these developments may well lead to a healthier financial system in the medium to long term: Increased investor scrutiny of structured credit products is likely to lead to greater transparency in these products and more rigor in the credit-rating process. And greater caution on the part of investors seems appropriate given the very narrow spreads and the loosening in some underwriting standards seen before the recent episode began. In the shorter term, however, these developments do imply a greater measure of financial restraint on economic growth as credit becomes more expensive and difficult to obtain.

    The Federal Reserve's Response to the Financial Turmoil
    Fortunately, the financial system entered the episode of the past few months with strong capital positions and a robust infrastructure. The banking system is healthy. Despite a few notable failures, hedge funds overall seem to have held up well, and their counterparties have not sustained material losses. The clearing and settlement infrastructure generally worked well despite trading volumes that were extremely high in some cases. Nevertheless, the market strains were serious, as I have discussed, and they posed risks to the broader economy. The Federal Reserve accordingly took a number of steps to help markets return to more orderly functioning.

    The Federal Reserve's initial action was to increase liquidity in short-term money markets through larger open market operations--the standard means by which it seeks to ensure that the federal funds rate stays at or near the target rate set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). A number of other central banks took similar steps. One source of pressure in the overnight market was the demand for dollar funding by European banks to which I alluded earlier. As Europe is in the latter part of its trading day when U.S. markets open, this extra demand for dollars at times led the federal funds rate to open well above the target. The extra provision of liquidity by the Fed helped counter the resulting pressure on the funds rate early in the day; it also eased banks' concerns about the availability of funding and thus assisted the functioning of the interbank market. To be clear, an open market operation can provide market participants with increased liquidity; but the intervention does not directly increase participants' capital or allow them to shed risk. In essence, these operations are short-term loans collateralized by government securities.

    The vigorous provision of funds through open market operations succeeded in damping pressures in overnight funding markets. Yet markets for term funding, including commercial paper markets as well as the interbank markets, remained strained, and signs of broader financial stress persisted. On August 17, the Fed took further action when the Federal Reserve Board cut the discount rate--the rate at which it lends directly to banks--by 50 basis points, or 1/2 percentage point. The Fed also adjusted its usual practices to facilitate the provision of financing for as long as thirty days, renewable at the request of the borrower.

    Loans through the discount window differ from open market operations in that they can be made directly to specific banks with strong demands for liquidity. (In contrast, open market operations are arranged with a limited set of dealers of government securities.) In addition, whereas open market operations typically involve lending against government securities, loans through the discount window can be made against a much wider range of collateral, including mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. As with open market operations, however, Fed lending through the discount window provides banks with liquidity, not risk capital. In particular, the strong collateralization accompanying discount window credit eliminates essentially all risk for the Federal Reserve System and the taxpayer. Nonetheless, the availability of the discount window is potentially significant for banks, as it gives them greater confidence that they can obtain additional liquidity as necessary. Access to a backstop source of liquidity in turn reduces the incentives of banks to limit the credit they provide to their customers and counterparties. The Federal Reserve also took some other steps in response to strains in financial markets, including reducing the fee that it charges for lending Treasury securities from its portfolio, thus helping to meet the heavy demands in the market for those securities.

    The Federal Reserve's actions to ease the liquidity strai
  12. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 08:38
    The Federal Reserve's efforts to provide liquidity appear to have been helpful on the whole. To be sure, the volume of loans to banks made through the discount window, though it increased for a time, has been modest. However, collateral placed by banks at the discount window in anticipation of possible borrowing rose sharply during August and September, suggesting that some banks viewed the discount window as a potentially valuable option. On the other hand, no amount of liquidity provision by the central bank can be expected to solve the problems regarding the valuation of complex securitized assets or to reverse the credit losses on subprime mortgages. These underlying difficulties will be resolved only over time by financial markets.

    Since mid-August the functioning of financial markets has improved to some degree, supported not only by liquidity provision but also by the monetary policy action taken in September, to which I will return in a moment. Interest rate spreads on ABCP have fallen by more than half from their recent peaks, and overall commercial paper outstanding has edged up this month after declining sharply over August and September. Interbank term funding markets have improved modestly, though spreads there remain unusually wide. Some progress has been made in bringing pending LBO-related loans to market, albeit at discounts and with tightened terms. Risk spreads in corporate bond markets have narrowed somewhat, the issuance of speculative-grade bonds has restarted, and investment-grade issuance has been strong. Volatility in many asset markets has declined toward more-normal levels. Perhaps most important, in many markets investors are showing an increased capacity and willingness to differentiate among assets of varying quality.

    In contrast, despite a few encouraging signs, conditions in mortgage markets remain difficult. The markets for securitized nonprime (that is, subprime and so-called alt-A) loans are showing little activity, securitizations of prime jumbo mortgages reportedly have increased only slightly from low levels, and the spread between the interest rates on nonconforming and conforming mortgages remains elevated. These continued problems suggest that investors will need more time to gather information and reevaluate risks before they are willing to reenter these markets.

    Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook
    The Federal Reserve's efforts to support the normal functioning of financial markets have as their ultimate objective the stability and efficiency of the broader economy. In addition, of course, the Federal Reserve can adjust the stance of monetary policy by changing its target for the federal funds rate. The FOMC manages monetary policy to further its dual mandate to promote maximum sustainable employment and price stability.

    The turmoil in financial markets significantly affected the Committee's outlook for the broader economy. Indeed, in a statement issued simultaneously with the Federal Reserve Board's August 17 announcement of the cut in the discount rate, the FOMC noted that the downside risks to growth had increased appreciably. However, to allow time to gather and evaluate incoming information, possible policy action was deferred until the Committee's next regularly scheduled meeting on September 18.

    A key issue at that meeting was the extent to which the market disturbances had affected the outlook for the housing sector. Financial markets overall had improved somewhat, but tighter terms and standards in the mortgage market--particularly in the nonprime and jumbo segments--appeared likely to intensify the correction in housing significantly, with adverse implications for construction activity and house prices. Indeed, incoming housing data had continued to soften even before the advent of the stress in financial markets. A further sharp contraction in residential construction seemed likely to hold down overall economic growth in the fourth quarter and in early 2008.

    As they had at earlier meetings, the participants in the September meeting evaluated the potential effects of housing-market developments on other parts of the economy. They agreed that significant spillovers to household and business spending were not yet evident. For example, auto sales had picked up in August from the low levels of earlier in the summer; and business investment did not appear to have been seriously affected by financial market developments, as highly rated firms continued to enjoy good access to credit. Strong growth abroad was also viewed as supporting U.S. exports and domestic production. And as I have noted, the available evidence suggested that overall economic growth in the third quarter remained moderate.

    However, downside risks to both household and business spending had clearly increased over the period since the Committee's previous meeting. Notably, the weak housing market, somewhat downbeat consumer sentiment, and slower growth in private-sector employment increased the likelihood that consumption spending would slow in coming quarters. Participants at the September meeting also reported somewhat greater caution in the outlooks of their business contacts. Financial market conditions were expected to improve slowly at best; and even if conditions began to normalize, credit would likely remain noticeably tighter for many borrowers than had been the case during the summer. Furthermore, any weakening in the economy could itself have a negative effect on still-fragile credit markets, possibly leading credit conditions to tighten further.

    Regarding the other half of its mandate, to promote price stability, the Committee noted some improvement over the past year in measures of the trend component of inflation, such as core inflation. Moreover, slower growth in aggregate demand would help to ease pressure on resources. But inflation risks remained, including still-high levels of resource utilization and elevated prices for oil and other commodities. The Committee agreed that continued close attention to inflation developments was warranted. Overall, given the great difficulty of knowing how financial conditions would evolve or the extent of their effect on the economy, Committee members judged the level of uncertainty in the outlook to be unusually high.

    As you know, the Committee chose to cut its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points at the September meeting. This action was intended to help offset the tightening of credit conditions resulting from the financial turmoil. Risk-management considerations also played a role in the decision, given the possibility that the housing correction and tighter credit could presage a broader weakening in economic conditions that would be difficult to arrest. By doing more sooner, policy might be able to forestall some part of the potential adverse effects of the disruptions in financial markets. As most of the meeting participants saw growth likely to run below trend for a while and with the incoming inflation data on the favorable side, the risks to inflation from this action seemed acceptable, especially as the Committee was prepared to reverse the policy easing if inflation pressures proved stronger than expected.

    Since the September meeting, the incoming data have borne out the Committee's expectations of further weakening in the housing market, as sales have fallen further and new residential construction has continued to decline ra
  13. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 08:39
    as sales have fallen further and new residential construction has continued to decline rapidly. The further contraction in housing is likely to be a significant drag on growth in the current quarter and through early next year. However, it remains too early to assess the extent to which household and business spending will be affected by the weakness in housing and the tightening in credit conditions. We will be following indicators of household and business spending closely as we update our outlook for near-term growth. The evolution of employment and labor income also will bear watching, as gains in real income support consumer spending even if the weakness in house prices adversely affects homeowners' equity. The labor market has shown some signs of cooling, but these are quite tentative so far, and real income is still growing at a solid pace.

    On the inflation side, prices of crude oil and other commodities have increased somewhat in recent weeks, and the foreign exchange value of the dollar has weakened. However, overall, the limited data that we have received since the September FOMC meeting are consistent with continued moderate increases in consumer prices. As the Committee noted in its post-meeting statement, we will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.

    It does seem that, together with our earlier actions to enhance liquidity, the September policy action has served to reduce some of the pressure in financial markets, although considerable strains remain. From the perspective of the near-term economic outlook, the improved functioning of financial markets is a positive development in that it increases the likelihood of achieving moderate growth with price stability. However, in such situations, one must also take seriously the possibility that policy actions that have the effect of reducing stress in financial markets may also promote excessive risk-taking and thus increase the probability of future crises. As I indicated in earlier remarks, it is not the responsibility of the Federal Reserve--nor would it be appropriate--to protect lenders and investors from the consequences of their financial decisions. But developments in financial markets can have broad economic effects felt by many outside the markets, and the Federal Reserve must take those effects into account when determining policy. In particular, as I have emphasized, the Federal Reserve has a mandate from the Congress to promote maximum employment and stable prices, and its monetary policy actions will be chosen so as to best meet that mandate.

    Indeed, although the Federal Reserve can seek to provide a more stable economic background that will benefit both investors and non-investors, the truth is that it can hardly insulate investors from risk, even if it wished to do so. Developments over the past few months reinforce this point. Those who made bad investment decisions lost money. In particular, investors in subprime mortgages have sustained significant losses, and many of the mortgage companies that made those loans have failed. Moreover, market participants are learning and adjusting--for example, by insisting on better mortgage underwriting and by performing better due diligence on structured credit products. Rather than becoming more crisis-prone, the financial system is likely to emerge from this episode healthier and more stable than before.

    Conclusion
    I have sought this evening to put recent financial market developments in context and to explain the thinking behind the steps taken by the Federal Reserve. This has been a challenging period. Conditions in financial markets have shown some improvement since the worst of the storm in mid-August, but a full recovery of market functioning is likely to take time, and we may well see some setbacks. In particular, investors are continuing to reassess the risks they face and have not yet fully regained confidence in their ability to accurately price certain types of securities. The ultimate implications of financial developments for the cost and availability of credit, and thus for the broader economy, remain uncertain.

    In coming months, the Federal Reserve, together with other agencies both here and abroad, will perform comprehensive reviews of recent events to better understand the episode and to draw lessons for the future. For now, the Federal Reserve will continue to watch the situation closely and will act as needed to support efficient market functioning and to foster sustainable economic growth and price stability.

  14. [verwijderd] 16 oktober 2007 09:55
    money.cnn.com/data/premarket/

    gaat verder down daar aan de overkant van de plas.

    nl bulls vinden het intussen nog maar wat vervelend om afscheid te moeten nemen van hun duur betaalde stukkies..

    de belgen en engelsen zijn wat zakelijker op dit punt..

    "inpakke en wegweze" zou ik zo zeggen..

    uw shortende R.

    eerste koersdoel 535, later 480.
876 Posts
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