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Vastgoedzeepbel

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  1. [verwijderd] 9 november 2007 10:57
    Een vastgoedzeepbel of onroerendgoedzeepbel is een economische zeepbel die periodiek voorkomt in vastgoedmarkten. Dit fenomeen wordt gekenmerkt door een snelle toename van de taxatiewaarde van onroerende zaken, zoals woningen, totdat een onhoudbaar niveau wordt bereikt t.o.v. de financieringslast en (voor beleggers) het rendement, alsmede andere economische elementen. Het kan worden gevolgd door een snelle daling van de waarde van het goed (onder meer bekend als het instorten van de huizenprijzen of een vastgoedcrash) met als gevolg dat vele eigenaren een hypotheekschuld hoger dan de waarde van het bezit overhouden. Net als in andere economische zeepbellen wordt meestal pas achteraf (na de crash) het eind van de zeepbel bepaald.

    Een vastgoedzeepbal wordt vaak aangejaagd door een lage rentestand, waardoor financiering, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van een hypotheek, relatief goedkoop te verkrijgen is. Hierdoor trekt de vraag naar vastgoed (als eigen woning of als beleggingsobject) aan. Omgekeerd wordt het leeglopen van een vastgoedzeepbel vaak geïnitieerd door een stijgende rente. De hieruit voortvloeiende hogere hypotheeklasten zorgen voor een afnemende vraag naar woningen en een daling van de huizenprijzen. Voor beleggers speelt met name het rendement op de belegging een rol. Zo lang dit rendement hoger is dan de financieringslast blijft de belegging betaalbaar. Daarnaast wordt het rendement op vastgoed voortdurend vergeleken met de rendementen op andere beleggingsvormen. Met name vastrentende waarden, zoals obligaties, worden hiervoor gebruikt. een stijgende rente geeft een hoger rendement op vastrentende waarden, waardoor een vastgoedbelegging onaantrekkelijker wordt.

    De "Economist" schreef dat "de huidige wereldwijde stijging van huizenprijzen de grootste vastgoedzeepbel in de geschiedenis is" en dat het probleem in vele gebieden voorkomt, zoals grote delen van de Verenigde Staten, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Nederland, Australië, Nieuw-Zeeland, Ierland, Spanje, Zuid-Afrika, India en China. Het crashen van de Japanse zeepbel vanaf 1990 was desastreus voor de Japanse economie en de mensen die het moesten doorstaan[1], hetzelfde geldt voor de recente vastgoedcrash in de grootste stad van China, Sjanghai. Ook het toenemende volume dat momenteel in Europees commercieel vastgoed (kantoren, winkels en bedrijfsruimte) wordt belegd wordt door steeds meer partijen aangeduid als een zeepbel. Deze investeringsdruk uit zich in steeds hogere prijzen voor de meest aantrekkelijke objecten, waardoor de rendementen (bij aankoop meestal in eerste instantie aangeduid middels het bruto aanvangsrendement of BAR) scherp dalen.

    In tegenstelling tot een beurscrash na een zeepbel is een vastgoedcrash gewoonlijk een langzamer proces omdat de eigenaren, indien mogelijk, doorgaans vast blijven houden aan hun vastgoed en weigeren om het object tegen een substantieel lagere prijs te verkopen. Historisch gezien blijven de prijzen gemiddeld dan ook meestal "vlak" voor een periode van 3-5 jaar en door de inflatie zakken de prijzen dan nominaal gezien niet. Er zijn uitzonderingen, zoals in Los Angeles in de beginjaren 90, waar zowel de echte als de nominale waarde van het vastgoed instortte. Door de huidige lage inflatie in de meeste landen is de verwachting dat de meeste correcties een instorting van de echte en de nominale waarde van vastgoed tot gevolg zullen hebben.

    Bron: wikipedia
  2. [verwijderd] 9 november 2007 11:23
    KASHIWA, Japan

    FOURTEEN years ago, Yoshihisa Nakashima looked at this sleepy suburb an hour and 20 minutes from downtown Tokyo and saw all the trappings of middle-class Japanese bliss: cherry-tree-lined roads, a cozy community where neighbors greeted one another in the morning and schools within easy walking distance for his two daughters.

    So Mr. Nakashima, a Tokyo city government employee who was then 36, took out a loan for almost the entire $400,000 price of a cramped four-bedroom apartment. With property values rising at double-digit rates, he would easily earn back the loan and then some when he decided to sell.

    Or so he thought. Not long after he bought the apartment, Japan's property market collapsed. Today, the apartment is worth half what he paid. He said he would like to move closer to the city but cannot: the sale price would not cover the $300,000 he still owes the bank.

    With housing prices in the United States looking wobbly after years of spectacular gains, it may be helpful to look at the last major economy to have a real estate bubble pop: Japan. What Americans see may scare them, but they may also learn ways to ease the pain.

    To be sure, there are several major differences between Japan in the 1980's and the United States today. One is the fact that property prices rose much faster and more steeply in Japan, partly because speculators used paper profits from a booming stock market to invest in property, insupportably leveraging the prices of both higher and higher.

    Another difference is that the biggest speculators in Japan's frenzy were deep-pocketed corporations, and they pumped up the commercial property market at the same time that home prices were inflating.

    Still, for anyone wondering why even the possibility of a housing bubble in the United States preoccupies so many economists, it is worth looking at how the property crash in Japan helped to flatten that economy, which is second only to that of the United States, and to keep it on the canvas for more than a decade.

    And as American homeowners contemplate what might happen if their property values fell -particularly if they fell hard - there are lessons in the bitter experiences of their Japanese counterparts like Mr. Nakashima.

    JAPAN suffered one of the biggest property market collapses in modern history. At the market's peak in 1991, all the land in Japan, a country the size of California, was worth about $18 trillion, or almost four times the value of all property in the United States at the time.

    Then came the crashes in both stocks and property, after the Japanese central bank moved too aggressively to raise interest rates. Both markets spiraled downward as investors sold stocks to cover losses in the land market, and vice versa, plunging prices into a 14-year trough, from which they are only now starting to recover.

    Now the land in Japan is worth less than half its 1991 peak, while property in the United States has more than tripled in value, to about $17 trillion.

    Homeowners were among the biggest victims of the Japanese real estate bubble. In Japan's six largest cities, residential prices dropped 64 percent from 1991 to last year. By most estimates, millions of homebuyers took substantial losses on the largest purchase of their lives.

    Their experiences contain many warnings. One is to shun the sort of temptations that appear in red-hot real estate markets, particularly the use of risky or exotic loans to borrow beyond one's means. Another is to avoid property that may be hard to unload when the market cools.

    Economists say Japan also contains lessons for United States policy makers, like Ben S. Bernanke, who is expected to become chairman of the Federal Reserve at the end of January. At the top of the list is to learn from the failure of Japan's central bank to slow the rise of the country's real estate and stock bubbles, and then its failure to soften their collapse. Only recently did Japan finally find ways to revive the real estate market, by using deregulation to spur new development.

    Most of all, economists say, Japan's experience teaches the need to be skeptical of that fundamental myth behind all asset bubbles: that prices will keep rising forever. Like their United States counterparts today, too many Japanese homebuyers overextended their debt, buying property that cost more than they could rationally afford because they assumed that values would only rise. When prices dropped, many buyers were financially battered or even wiped out.

    "The biggest lesson from Japan is not to fall into the same state of denial that existed here," said Yukio Noguchi, a finance professor at Waseda University in Tokyo who is perhaps the leading authority on the Japanese bubble.

    "During a bubble, people don't believe that prices will fall," he said. "This has been proven wrong so many times in the past. But there's something in human nature that makes us unable to learn from history."

    In the 1980's, Professor Noguchi said, the frenzy in Japan reached such extremes that companies tried to outbid one another even for land of little or no use. At the peak, an empty three-square-meter parcel (about 32 square feet) in a corner of the Ginza shopping district in Tokyo sold for $600,000, even though it was too small to build on.

    Plots only slightly larger gave birth to bizarre structures known as pencil buildings: tall, thin structures that often had just one small room per floor.

    As a result, Japan's property market in the 1980's was much more fragile than America's today, Professor Noguchi said. And when the market fell, it fell hard. Because of all the corporate speculation, the collapse wiped out company balance sheets, crippled the nation's banks and gave the overall economy a blow to the chin.

    Since 1991, Japan has spent 11 years sliding in and out of recession. It is only now showing meaningful signs of recovering, with the World Bank forecasting that Japan's economy will grow by a solid 2.2 percent this year

    Despite the differences, Professor Noguchi said he also saw parallels between Japan then and America now. Last year, as a visiting professor at Stanford, he said he read real estate articles in local newspapers that sounded eerily familiar. Houses were routinely selling for $10 million or more, he said, with buyers saying they felt that they had no choice but to buy now, before prices rose even further.

    "It was déjà vu," Professor Noguchi said. "People were in a rush to buy, and at extraordinary prices. I saw this same haste psychology in Japan" in the 1980's. "The classic definition of a bubble," he added, "is people buying on false expectations about future prices, and buying with the hope of selling in the future."

    Economists and real estate experts see other parallels as well. In the 1980's, the expectation of rising real estate prices made many Japanese homebuyers feel comfortable about taking on huge debt. And they did so by using exotic loans that required little money upfront and that promised low monthly payments, at least for a short time.

    A similar pattern is found today in the United States, where the methods include interest-only mortgages, which allow homebuyers to repay no principal for a few years. Japan had its own versions of these loans, including the so-called three-generation loan, a 90- or even 100-year mortgage that permitted buyers to spread payments out over their lifetimes and thos
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